This paper develops a theoretical and empirical methodology to analyze public attitudes toward competing public policies. The model is applied to data on Iowa farmers' opinions of four agricultural policies: continuing the current program, targeting benefits to fiscally stressed farmers, mandatory acreage controls, and shifting to a free market. The results show that a farmer's financial situation, size and type of operation, education, and farm experience significantly influence his opinions. Attitudes toward mandatory controls and targeting are most sensitive, and attitudes toward continuation of the current program are least sensitive to changes in economic characteristics. Strong identi fiable camps of both support and opposition are found for each policy except the current program.
'
:
. An-Analysis of ' " • Farmers* Agricultural Policy Preferences:
An Ordered Frobit Approach
Ifhile apparent interest and innovations in agricultural issues typically intensify before the drafting of co^rehensive farm policy legislation, the mix of policy tools adopted are selected from a relatively finite array of policy options (Cochran; Boschvitz; Harkin) .
The broad range of diverse agricultural interests and options available makes consensus on a policy framework or reform in^robable.
Understanding who supports various policy proposals and under what circumstances those preferences change would be helpful to policymakers and analysts in assessing likely support and in developing strategies to alter support. This paper dievelops a theoretical model, eii^)irical Strategy, and an analysis of results for one data set to provide this understanding• In recent years, there have been several surveys of farmersf opinion on government agricultural policies. Topically, the results of these sui^eys are reported as the proportion of all respondents who support a given policy initiative (Guither et al.; Jordan and Tweeten) .
Some analysts have disaggregated farmers into groups and theii have reported the level of support for the policies within each group (Zulauf et al.; Coughenour and Christenson; Padgitt and Lasley) , Others have focused on correlation between policy preferences and socioeconomic variables (Edelman and Lasley; Lasley et al.) . While these studies provide much information,^they have left three important questions unanswered. There is little understanding of why or how farmers form their opinions.
whether distinctive groups of farmers hold certain preferences and how farmers' opinions will change in the future.
Studies that concentrate on average responses of farmers in a given group or correlations may yield misleading interpretations because other factors are not held constant. Group averages, in particular, may disguise heterogeneity of farmers within the group. For escan^le, if farmers with gross farm income above $200,000 are defined as a group, there may be considerable variation in gross farm inccnne and in farmers' opinion that is not accurately captured by the group mean.
Here we attempt to solve the methodological and theoretical diffic ulties encountered in previous studies of farmisrs' opinions.on agri cultural policy.
I. THEORY
We assume that farmers face a range of potential governn^t agri cultural policies. Afarmer will support policies that are ejected to b^efit him relative to the ejected value of the alternative policies.
A farmer will oppose policies whose relative expected benefits are negative. Afarmer will be indifferent or uncertain about policies that are expected to be neither beneficial nor harmful relative to alterna tive policies. Alternatively, one could say that a farmer will be indifferent toward policies whose eaq)ected benefits relative to the policy alternatives are not significantly different from zero.
We assume that farmers attempt to maximize the present value of profit from their operations. If this is correct, then fanner support of various government policy alternatives should be subject to the same type of rent-seeking behavior that is commonly assumed in derived. input demand or output supply applications;-^. < '
To begin, suppose that there are n-possible mutually exclusive governmental policies that might potentially-belapplied in agriculture;
S , S , .... S Each of these policies has^an associated probability of implementation,^2* "*'^n' that H-.Pg + ... " *•°-The expected present value of profit conditional-upon the in5>lementation-of policy evaluiated-in period;.zero will bet'(
where E is the expectation operator, B is the discount factor, 0 < B < 1, is the profit under policy at time t, and is the informa tion set the operator has upon which to base his expectations of future profit at tijne zero.
We can construct an espected present value of profit under all 3/--. ... possible policies as:-(2) n°(Q^) =Pin^(o^) +Pj n^(0o).+ •••• +F"n"(Qgj so that the farmer's unconditioned esqiected profit will be the weighted sum of the conditional expected present values of profit under each policy, with the.probability of policy i's occurrence being the weight associated with n (n ). .o, where X, is one of n farm or farmer characteristics in the information
set, pj is the effect of Xj on e3q)ected profit \inder policy S^, and e^is an approximation error assumed to be uncprrelated with X., j*"l» n. If we define a variable to be an observed indicator of farmer support for policy S., we can write the empirical approximation of (3) a s : • Policies will' also differ in their short-run and long-run. duplica tions for farm profitability;' Therefore, a farmer's time horizon may r determine-the type of policies he supports. Farmers-'who are financially stressed would prefer policies that target benefits to those in danger* of insolvency. On the other hwd, financially-secure operators may oppose such policies, -both because they gain nothing from them and because they stand to lose potential opportunities for expansion of their own operations. This latter incentive will be strongest for operators who-have a larger net worth against-which to borrow in order to acquire new land and capital. 'Younger operators are: more likely to .
support policies that will increase'long-term profitability, whereas older operators may-prefer shorter-term policies. Operators who have .
dependents may prefer long-term policies-if they plan'to pass the operar tion on to their children. ' ' • Finally', macroeconomic indicators such as interest rates, monetap olicy, exchange rates, and foreign agricultural policy may be relevant elements of the information set. In general, farmers will hold different e:q)ectations of the future paths of these variables. However; data on individual expectations are not available, and publicly avail able information on these macroeconomic variables-, at the time of the survey would be common to all agents in:our sample. . In.practice, therer fore, we have no variation in these'variables across observations and their impacts are incorporated in the constant term. We discuss the empirical specification of the information set dn the next section. The. tabulation of..responses by survey, participants is .reported at.
the top for Table: !. : The proposal-t0\continue^current.,programs had the highest level of support..:(57.i 6; percent) ,' follpwed-by, the decoupling .. for the four agricultural policy options are presented in Table 2 . The regressors' were all* rescaled to lie between -10 and 10 to help the estimation converge. The ordered prbbit procedure estimates were obtained using LIBDEP.-^Accompanying the parameter estimates is an interpretation of the results as elasticities which are' presented in Table 3 . These elasticities are calculated by evaluating .the predicted .
probability of support for a given policy from a 10 percent change in an individual exogenous variable. As noted in the .theoretical section, the farmers' responses are interpreted as the difference between the conditional and unconditional estimate of the farmer's expected profit.
The results provide a The information on response -elasticities in higher gross farm income^d net worth tended to oppose this, option.-F armers with livestock operations tended to oppose mandatory controls.
Less-educated farmers and their spouses tended to support mandatory controls. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individuals with higher levels of human capital will prefer policies that increase .
decision-making flexibility, thus making.human capital'more iiq)ortant.
Increasing levels of farm stress were also associated with increasingŝ upport for mandatory controls, although, not at a significant level.
There were also several very, identifiable characteristics of supporters for targeting financial assistance to the more severely stressed farm operators.* As^the degree.of -financial stress Increases,-the degree of support for targeting increases significantly. Curiously, higher gross farm income was associated with increased support for targeting, but higher net worth decreased support. The effect of net worth was more significant with an elasticity nearly twice as large , as the effect of gross' farm Income. . Also Interesting was tl^t more experienced farmers tended to support targeting fiscal stress.
Apparently the tendency of farmers^with shorter time horizons to prefer policies aimed at short-term profits outweighs the tendency of those with more human capital" to support .policies allowing, more flexibility.
More-educated farm spouses supported targeted benefits but more-educated farmers opposed the policy. Although not significant, crop aiid livestock fanners tehdiBd to support targeting.
There are fever identifiable groups^isupporting or opposing the option for decoupling; Farmers supporting decoupling.tend to have fever.
acres^but have-a higher net vorth relative-to those farmers yho are.
12/ opposed to this option.-" The paucity, of significant., identifiablesupport or opposition-to the decoupling:', option may be becaiue the proposal vas' too nev and not yet understood so that .many farmers my.
•
have not yet formed firm opinion .on .the policy's; intact on --profitability. The relatively high 23 percent:of farmers undecided suggests that many are still seeking infprmtibn on:the option;: r. ;
• The only significant" coefficient. in the'regression e3q>laining.
support for the current program is the negative:effect qn support, of^the.
number of dependents • -Even in this case'i the elasticity is e^remely small, 'Within our framework, the lack of significant relationships, could indicate that the probability of continuing the. current programs is so high that there is' no significant difference between the conditional and unconditional .ejqiected'profit. While our results • suggest that 'there is some' measurable lack .of, constituent support-, for the current program-, it also means that there: is no significant r c •' The results from this.section provide an economic rationale for why farmers tend to support different types of farm policies.. The most striking finding from this analysis is that farm support for the existing farm programs is virtuallyinsensitive-to changes in farm financial position or farm characteristics': While support for mandatory controls atid targeting of program benefits' to-financially stressed .
farmers has consistently higher elasticities, none is larger than the 10 percent change in a given factor.'^e iji^lication is that large changes in farm characteristics or financial position would-be required".-to alter farmers' opinions significantly away from existing programs.
V, TEST FOR CONSISTENCY OF CONSTITUENT INTERESTS
The previous section describes what types of farmers seem to favor or reject various policy alternatives. Howevereven though the results seem to indicate tlmt there are, identifiable c^s of support for and against these policies, we have not,formally tested whether these canps are, in fact, •significantly distinct. For exan5>le, it would be.valuable, to determine if the parties favoring mandatory controls object to the alternative policies or whether ihdiyidi^ls favoring.mandatory controls also, favor, any alternative• to the. current pplicy*. A. test of the hypothesis that these policies have identifiable camps of support and opposition is if a farmer with a high, probability of accepting one policy has a low probability of accepting alternative. poHcies. If the farm policies, considered do not generate uzuque,can^s. of support, then-there .would be no systematic relationship between the .probability of supporting one-policy relative to another. If two policies have similar.can^s of support, then there should be a positive correlation between the probability of supporting .the two policies. Obviously, the latter two cases would make it easier for any given policy to be implemented without significant organized opposition. However, the first case, where there is significant,negative correlation between the probability of accepting any two policies, would. ia5)ly that in^lementing a given policy would be more likely to generate significant.organized opposition.
This.discussion suggests a second specification for the information.
seti which includes the predicted probabilities that the individ^l accepts the other policies as additional regressors,. In particular, for.
any policy i, we would specify:
where Pr (Yj» 2) is the probability that the individual would approve of policy j, and 0^is the" effect of the probability bf approval of policy ,
on the expected relative profitability of policy i. If fij.is positive, then individuals who expect to benefit froin j also eacpect' to benefit from i. If flj is negative, then individuals who expect to benefit from j e3q)ect to lose from i. If 6j is small numerically and statistically, ' then there is no systematic relationship between support for .policies j .
and i.
The probability of acceptance of policy i is 1 -F • where F(*) 4s the standard normal cumulative distribution func^on, -is the estimated threshold coefficient, and is the estimated value of -n°. Because of the nonlineafities of the relationship, we could generate probabilities of policy acceptance for each farmer by using the results reported in Table 2 . As an added precaution to insure identifi cation, we reestimated the predicted'probabilities of acceptance with regional duimny variables,-the farmer's age;-and the square of his age included in the'infonnation set as additional identifiers. We then added these predicted probabilities to our original ordered.-probit specification",' These results are reported iii Table; 4:with PRTARG, PRMAND, PRpEC, and PRCONT representing, respectively, the. predicted probabilities that-the fanner approves/of targeting financial stress, mandatory•production controls, decoupling," and continuation, of the^.
current program." The results, stronglyrsupport the conjecture ,that.,there exist strong and consistent can^s of support (and, hence, opposition) for all the policy alternatives considered. f-All but one of the/coeffi-.
cients on the'predicted probabilitiies are; negative, the exception being a-positive'but insignificant effect of.the-probability of accepting mandatory controls on the esqiected relative profitability of decoupling.
On the other hand, significant-negative^effects on decoupling support occur as the probability incre'asesr. 
VI. .SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
This, study-developed ,a theoretical; model of farmers' opinion formation, which relates a fanner's support of opposition on a policyoption to the farmer's-expected profit from the policy. -An en5>irical strategy was proposed for mapping -the theoretical model to a data set.
Specifically, we showed that the model leads directly to an ordered probit specification. The estimated coefficients were interpretable as comparative static effects of a given factor on expected profit under a given policy relative to the unconditional effect of the factor on expected profit. The sign and significance of the.coefficients were used to determine the type of fanners who support or oppose a given policy option.
The eii5)irical teat ofthe model yielded.many interesting results. .
Among these,"we,rfound t^t. a farmer's financial circu^tance stroi^ly.
influences his^policy opinions, as does the size of^his operation* A farmer's-education,. fann^^erience,^and.;type, of operation also influence his opinions. In most casesthe. pattern of support for ,a given policy is. consistent T^th expectations ,concerni^how the policy will affect a farmer's profits.
The results show that farmers' support of mandatory controls or targeting fiscal stress are relatively sensitive to changes in farmers', economic and personal characteristics but that support for the existing farm program is virtually insensitive to these changes. The iji5>lication
is that large general increases in farm fiscal stress or large general reductions in farm net worth would be necessa^to shift farm opinion away from the current program and toward an alternative farm program.
The results also show the existence of identifiable and distinct pflmpg of support for and against alternative farm policies. Increasing the probability that a farmer supports a given policy reduces the probability that the farmer will support th^alternative policies. This result further supports the conclusion that it will be difficult to -^Once again, this result is"consistent *dth economic theory biit contrary to popular perceptions. in footnote 10, the reason that larger farms •may be viewed as more ;Supportive of decoupling may be attributable to the fact that they have, higher average net. worth, andnet worth is positively correlated with support for decoupling.
f-f . -^These numbers are the percentage change in the probability of supj the policy, given a 10 percent increase in-the specified exogenouE holding all other variables at their sample mean. PR(Z=2) repress predicted probability of supporting the given policy evaluated at means. '^Test of the null hypothesis that predicted support for the three alternative programs has no effect on support for-the given program. 
